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RETHINKING THE EUROPEAN MODEL LAW OF SET-OFF 
IN THE ERA OF BREXIT AND THE RECENT REFORM 
OF THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE
Lidija ©imunoviÊ ∗
Abstract: In 2003 the Commission on European Contract Law (herein-
after: CECL) published the Principles of European Contract Law Part 
III (hereinafter: PECL III) which contained the provisions on EU set-off 
(hereinafter: EU model law of set-off). These are soft law provisions 
whose text was the result of the work of the most prominent academ-
ics from EU Member States. Considering that the Germanic, Romanic, 
and English set-off models coexist on the territory of the EU, the EU 
model law of set-off represents a reconciliation of the different private 
law traditions and models of set-off. During the 25 years since the 
adoption of the EU model law of set-off, several signifi cant changes 
have occurred in the EU, which relate to its set-off law directly and 
indirectly. The most signifi cant change is certainly the issue of Brexit 
and the possibility of Great Britain leaving the EU. Furthermore, it is 
important to note that automatic set-off was abandoned in France, 
which means it has replaced the Romanic set-off model with the Ger-
man model.
This paper starts with the context in which the European set-off rules 
were adopted. Then, the author identifi es the nomotechnical and prac-
tical defi ciencies in the EU model law of set-off in the context of the 
changed circumstances in the EU. The fi nal part of the paper presents 
propositions for the change of the existing EU model law of set-off, 
which would help overcome the identifi ed defi ciencies and gaps. Con-
sideration is also given to the question of whether, after Brexit and the 
change in the French set-off rules, the provisions of the EU model law 
of set-off which were infl uenced by English and French set-off laws 
should be removed. 
Keywords: set-off, EU set-off, PECL III, Brexit
1 Introduction 
Set-off, as a means of discharging obligations, is not limited by state 
borders. Parties to set-off are mostly merchants from different states 
whose national set-off rules can differ signifi cantly across the EU ter-
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ritory.1  An additional issue can arise due to the fact that the national 
set-off rules of one party do not necessarily have to be known or available 
to the other party to set-off. For the above-mentioned reasons, the idea 
was born for the creation of set-off rules at the EU level which would be 
uniformly interpreted across the EU. 
Legal experts who started advocating for the adoption of a Euro-
pean Civil Code which would be applicable across the EU in the 1980s2 
had the most signifi cant role in the development of the EU model law of 
set-off.3 The Commission on European Contract Law (hereinafter: CECL) 
was established for that purpose.4 The fi rst work as a product of the 
CECL was published in as early as 1995: Principles of European Contract 
Law Part I.5 This document prescribed the principles of European Con-
tract Law, which were designed to be acceptable to all EU Member States. 
Thereupon, in 1999, the second part of PECL was published.6  Finally, 
the third part − PECL III − was published in 2003 and it contained the 
EU model law of set-off.7 The purpose of the adoption of this EU model 
law of set-off was the establishment of a common core of set-off rules 
1  This paper was created as a result of research conducted at the Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, Germany, for which the author 
received a one-month scholarship. In the paper, the term EU model law of set-off refers only 
to the provisions of PECL III. The term Romanic model of set-off refers to the Italian, Spanish 
and Greek national rules on set-off. The term Germanic model of set-off refers to the Ger-
man, Swiss and Austrian national rules on set-off. In this sense, see R Zimmermann, Com-
parative Foundations of a European Law of Set-off and Prescription (CUP 2002) 36. Wood 
uses for Romanic model of set-off the term Napoleonic group, and for the Germanic model of 
set-off, the term Roman-Germanic group of set-off. See PR Wood, Set-Off and Netting, Deriv-
atives, Clearing Systems (Sweet and Maxwell 2007) 10-11. 
2  In this sense, see, for example: S Leible & M Lehmann, European Contract Law and 
German Law (Kluwer Law International 2014) 630, 645-648, 693-696, 700-710; Zimmer-
mann (n 1) 18-60. See also S PetriÊ, ‘Introduction to the Principles of European Contract 
Law’ (2008) 29(1) Journal of the Faculty of Law in Rijeka 1-10; S PetriÊ, ‘The Draft Joint 
Referent Framework for European Private Law’ (2009) 30(1) Journal of the University of 
Rijeka Faculty of Law 473; E MišËeniÊ, ‘European Contract Law on the Road From Soft 
Law to Hard Law: An Overview of the Optional Common European Sales Law (CESL)’ 
(2012) 33(2) Journal of the University of Rijeka Faculty of Law 695; D BabiÊ & D ZgrabljiÊ 
Rotar, ‘The Reform of Confl ict of Law Rules for Contractual Obligations in Law’ (2010) 
Croatian Law Journal 54.
3  The term ‘European law of set-off’ was introduced by Zimmermann (n 1) 18.
4  L ©imunoviÊ, ‘Set-off’ (PhD thesis, Zagreb Faculty of Law 2019) 30.
5  PetriÊ, Principles of European Contract Law (n 2). 
6  ibid. 
7  ibid. The reason for the adoption of these rules was the national particularity of the regu-
lation of the private law subject matter in the national legislature of the EU Member States, 
which was seen as an obstacle to the maintenance of a unique EU market. For more, see D 
AkšamoviÊ & S JeliniÊ, ‘UEU Contract Law at a Turning Point’ (2010) 60(1) Journal of the 
Faculty of Law Zagreb 203. 
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which would serve as a model for the adoption and interpretation of the 
law of the EU and the EU Member States. 8  
Today, 25 year later, it is time to assess the impact and importance 
of the EU model law of set-off.9 The EU model law of set-off was and still 
is the starting point for a broad range of doctrinal discussions because 
they represent a reconciliation of diverging private law traditions and 
set-off models. 
Accordingly, this paper starts with the context in which the Europe-
an set-off rules were adopted. Afterwards, the author provides an over-
view and analysis of the provisions of the EU model law of set-off. These 
provisions are analysed in the context of the changes which occurred on 
the EU market as well. The most signifi cant change which is analysed 
refers to the issue of the sustainability of the applicable rules in cir-
cumstances where Great Britain is considering leaving the EU through 
Brexit. Furthermore, it is important to note that automatic set-off was 
abandoned in France, which means they have replaced the Romanic set-
off model with the Germanic model. The fi nal part of the paper aims 
to initiate future academic debate on the EU model law of set-off and 
gives future propositions for the EU model law of set-off, which would 
help overcome the identifi ed defi ciencies and gaps. The paper also asks 
whether, after Brexit and the change in the French set-off rules, the pro-
visions of the EU model law of set-off which were infl uenced by English 
and French set-off laws should be removed.
2 The period prior to the adoption of the EU model law of set-off 
An attempt to create unifi ed rules of the law on obligations, ie a Eu-
ropean Civil Code, was introduced back in 1982 by the Lando Commis-
sion10 which consisted of esteemed legal experts and academics.11 In or-
der to adopt the EU model law of set-off, the Lando Commission studied 
8  This attempt to unify the EU model law of set-off through PECL III was not an isolat-
ed project. Later documents, such as the Draft Common Frame of Reference (hereinafter: 
DCFR) of 2017 also dealt with and regulated the issue of the EU model law of set-off. DCFR 
regulates set-off in its third book Obligations and Rights. This paper makes special refer-
ence to the set-off provisions from DCFR, because they are largely similar to the provisions 
of PECL III. ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 29-30. 
9  For the purposes of this paper, the term set-off is not limited only to set-off as recognised 
by the national legislatures as a means of discharging mutual claims. Therefore, this paper 
does not address procedural or contractual set-off. Furthermore, the paper does not anal-
yse the provisions which govern set-off in bankruptcy and execution proceedings, because 
these types of set-off are subject to the mandatory provisions of national set-off rules.  
10  Commission on European Contract Law.
11  ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 28.
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the provisions of ten national laws of EU Member States on set-off. 12 The 
three legal systems which stood out with distinguished models of set-off 
on the EU territory were Germany, England and France. In addition, oth-
er sources used in the adoption of PECL were the Uniform Commercial 
Code, Restatements of Law, the UNIDROIT Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts, and the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (hereinafter: CISG).13
The starting point for the analysis of the national laws and the iden-
tifi ed set-off models were the common features of all the national set-off 
rules of the EU Member States.14 In this sense, it was concluded that 
under all the reviewed systems, the terms ‘set-off’ and ‘compensation’ 
represent means of obligation discharge. It was also understood that 
there has been little systemic discussion on set-off in legal literature, 
that set-off is distinguished from set-off by agreement and compensable 
counter-claims, and that these are different legal terms.15 
After establishing the preliminary conclusions, members of the 
Lando Commission narrowed their research only to the decision on the 
legal nature of set-off and the occurrence of its legal effects. The dilemma 
was whether set-off should be of a substantive or procedural nature, ie 
whether it should be automatic or unilateral and what impact this would 
have on the moment the effects of set-off occur. There were not many 
disagreements on these issues within the Commission, and thus the 
members easily agreed that set-off in the EU would be of a substantive 
and not of a procedural nature, and that it would occur at the moment of 
the unilateral notifi cation of set-off (the so-called ex nunc effect) after the 
requirements for set-off were met, and not automatically by force of law, 
or from the moment the requirements for set-off were fulfi lled.16 
Despite the fact that consensus was easily reached, the discussions 
of the Lando Commission lasted for a longer time because the academics 
lingered on the doctrinal proof and on the confi rmation of the thesis that 
the proposed solutions were correct and optimal. One of the most elab-
orated theses regarding the EU model law of set-off was the justifi cation 
12  Zimmerman states that a systematic analysis of Austrian, Dutch, English, French, Ger-
man, Greek, Italian, Scottish, Spanish and Swedish law was undertaken for these purpos-
es. Zimmermann (n 1) 18.
13  ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 29.
14  See Zimmermann (n 1) 1-17; ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 29. On the concept of set-off in compara-
tive legal systems, see more in the chapter of Zimmermann (n 1) 19; P Pichonnaz & L Gul-
lifer, Set-off in Arbitration and Commercial Transactions (OUP 2014) 3.
15  Zimmermann (n 1) 18-22; ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 30.
16  Zimmermann (n 1) 56-60. More details on this will be provided in the following sections.
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of the ex nunc effect of the EU model law of set-off.17 This was due to the 
extensive scholarly debates which took place around the adoption of the 
Dutch Civil Code, which was enacted before PECL III and which adopted 
the retroactive model.18 At the time of the adoption of PECL III, the major-
ity of countries at a comparative level (apart from the Nordic countries) 
had a retroactive effect of set-off. The creators of PECL did not follow the 
national solutions, nor those from the Dutch Civil Code, and they opted 
for the ex nunc effect of set-off. 
The members of the Lando Commission justifi ed their decision by 
stating that, contrary to the position held in the majority of national 
legislatures, retroactive effect was based on unjustifi ed and unverifi ed 
doctrinal determinations.19 The introduction of the ex nunc effect by the 
creators of PECL was justifi ed by the fact that the effects of set-off do not 
have to be identical to the effects of payment or performance, and that 
the ex nunc effect leads to better results than the retroactive effect in the 
assessment of the effects of non-performance, interest and contractual 
penalties.20 
All the work dedicated to the development of EU model law of set-off 
has resulted in the seven articles on EU set-off which were drafted by the 
CECL, and almost completely accepted in the fi nal version of PECL III.21
17  N Jansen & R Zimmermann (eds), Commentaries on European Contract Laws (OUP 2002) 
1810.
18  ibid.
19  Zimmermann (n 1) 60.
20  ibid, 39.
21  See ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 31. O Lando & H Beale, Principles of European Contract Law, 
Performance, Non-performance and Remedies (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1999) 95. For an 
easier understanding of the following analysis, the exact content of the EU model law of set-
off is provided here: ‘Article 13:101: Requirements for Set-off: If two parties owe each other 
obligations of the same kind, either party may set off that party’s right to performance (“claim”) 
against the other party’s claim, if and to the extent that, at the time of set-off, the fi rst party: (a) 
is entitled to effect performance; and (b) may demand the other party’s performance. Article 
13:102: Unascertained Claims: (1) A debtor may not set off a claim which is unascertained 
as to its existence or value unless the set-off will not prejudice the interests of the other party. 
(2) Where the claims of both parties arise from the same legal relationship it is presumed that 
the other party’s interests will not be prejudiced. Article 13:103: Foreign Currency Set-Off: 
Where parties owe each other money in different currencies, each party may set off that 
party’s claim against the other party’s claim, unless the parties have agreed that the party 
declaring set-off is to pay exclusively in a specifi ed currency. Article 13:104: Notice of Set-
Off: The right of set-off is exercised by notice to the other party. Article 13:105: Plurality of 
Claims and Obligations: (1) Where the party giving notice of set-off has two or more claims 
against the other party, the notice is effective only if it identifi es the claim to which it relates. 
(2) Where the party giving notice of set-off has to perform two or more obligations towards the 
other party, the rules in Article 7:109 apply with appropriate adaptations. Article 13:106: 
Effect of Set-Off: Set-off discharges the obligations, as far as they are coextensive, as from 
the time of notice. Article 13:107: Exclusion of Right of Set-Off: Set-off cannot be effected: 
(a) where it is excluded by agreement; (b) against a claim to the extent that that claim is not 
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3 Present: the EU model law of set-off
3.1 Scope of application 
The text of PECL III itself states that the EU set-off provisions should 
be applied even without the parties’ explicit consent in two instances.22 
The EU model law of set-off is applicable if the parties agree that their 
contract is governed by general principles of contract law, lex mercatoria, 
or if they conclude a clause to a similar effect.23 The aforementioned pro-
visions will be applied even if the parties do not agree to the law govern-
ing their contract and if it cannot be determined.24
In this sense, it could be concluded that the EU model law of set-off 
might be considered as model law and thus may represent a source of 
law in situations when contractual parties refer to them. In addition, the 
CJEU and the national courts might refer to the PECL in the context of 
contract interpretation or interpretation of contract law. This means that 
the EU model law of set-off will be applied even if the parties do not agree 
to the law governing their contract and if it cannot be determined. 
3.2 Requirements for set-off 
The EU model law of set-off does not provide a defi nition of set-off, 
but it opens with the circumstances under which obligations can be ter-
minated through set-off. Article 13:101 PECL III provides that in the case 
where two parties owe each other obligations of the same kind, either 
party may set off that party’s right to performance (‘claim’) against the 
other party’s claim, if and to the extent that, at the time of set-off, the 
fi rst party: (a) is entitled to effect performance; and (b) may demand the 
other party’s performance.25  
Therefore, it can be deduced that the requirements for set-off under 
the EU model law of set-off are the mutuality, the same kind and maturi-
ty of the obligation, while the obligation of the person seeking set-off does 
not have to be mature. Considering the fact that the above-mentioned 
requirements do not have the same meaning under different national 
laws, the following section analyses their meaning in the context of the 
EU model law of set-off.  
capable of attachment; and (c) against a claim arising from a deliberate wrongful act.’ <www.
trans-lex.org/400200/_/pecl/> accessed 12 June 2019.
22  See Article 1101 PECL III.
23  ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 30. Compare with Art 1101 para 3 PECL III.
24  ©imunoviÊ (n 4). In this sense, compare Art 1101 para 3.b PECL III, then, Leible & Leh-
mann (n 2) 2-3 and Lando & Beale (n 21) 95. 
25  Article 13:101 PECL III.
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3.2.1 Mutuality
Mutuality is the fi rst requirement for set-off under the EU model law 
of set-off.26 Under this requirement, both parties to set-off have to be the 
debtor and creditor of the other side simultaneously.27 These claims do 
not have to be of the same value or arise from the same legal basis.28 In 
order to establish mutuality as a requirement for set-off, the differences 
in the national legislatures of EU Member States have to be reconciled. 29 
Certain national legislation of Member States requires the claims to have 
the same legal basis, ie they have to be connected claims. 30  
If mutuality is observed in the context of the EU internal market, 
then the existence of mutuality as a requirement for set-off under the 
EU model law of set-off is a good solution, as it allows the effi ciency and 
practicality of trade. Otherwise, if only claims arising out of the same 
legal basis or those of the same value could be set-off, the number of 
compensable claims would signifi cantly decrease. 
3.2.2 Obligations of the same kind
The second requirement for set-off under the EU model law of set-
off is that the obligations have to be of the same kind.31  Claims are of 
the same kind if they both refer to money or another generic item of the 
same nature and quality.32  The existence of claims of the same kind 
is determined based on the moment when the set-off is raised.33  On 
a comparative level within the EU, there are divergent interpretations 
of this requirement. For example, under English law, only monetary 
26  According to the provision of Article 13:101 PECL III. 
27  Lat. concurs debiti et crediti. Zimmermann (n 1) 44-45.
28  Zimmermann (n 1)  45.
29  Cf § 387 German BGB; § 1438-144 Austrian ABGB; § 120 Swiss OR; Art 1291 French 
CC; Art 6:127 NGZ; Art 16.6 English Civil Procedure Rules of 1998; Art 1241-1243 Italian 
CC; Art 1196, 1197 and 1202 Spanish CC.
30  Zimmermann (n 1) 45; Wood (n 1) 509. For the set-off requirements in Croatian law, 
which is interpreted in the same way across the former Yugoslavia, see imunovi  (n 4) 100-
102. 
31  This requirement is not expressly defi ned, but its meaning can be derived from Article 
13:101 PECL III. 
32  Zimmermann (n 1) 48; O Lando, E Clive, A Prüm & R Zimmermann (eds), Principles of 
European Contract Law, Part III (Kluwer Law International 2003) 140.
33  Zimmermann (n 1)  48. See also M Schuetler in W Krüger (ed), Münchener kommentar 
zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, band 2: Schuldrecht-Allgemeiner Teil (2nd edn, CH Beck 
2016) 2651. For comparative law, compare § 387 BGB; § 1438 and § 1440 ABGB; § 120 
OR; Art 1291 French CC; Art 6:127 para 2 English Civil Procedure Rules of 1998; Art 1196 
Spanish CC; Art 1234 Italian CC. About the ‘same kind’ requirement from the perspective 
of comparative legal literature, see more in J Gernhuber, Die Erfüllung und ihre Surrogate 
sowie das Erlöschen der Schzldverhältnisse aus andren Gründen (Mohr Siebeck 1983) 67.
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claims can be set off, 34 while under German or French law non-mon-
etary claims can be set off as well, provided they are generic items of 
the same kind.35  
The most important practical issue regarding claims of the same 
kind which the creators of the EU model law of set-off had to overcome 
was the set-off of monetary claims expressed in different currencies.36 
This issue was regulated in Article 13:103 which provides that where 
parties owe each other money in different currencies, each party may set 
off that party’s claim against the other party’s claim, unless the parties 
have agreed that the party declaring set-off is to pay exclusively in a 
specifi ed currency.37  
Contrary to the EU model law of set-off, German law does not allow 
the set-off of monetary claims expressed in different currencies.38  De-
spite this, certain German authors are of the opinion that set-off should 
be allowed in such cases.39 Swiss and French literature is in line with 
such a modern understanding, which treats set-off claims expressed in 
different currencies as acceptable, as long as the currencies are mutu-
ally convertible, or there are other parameters which would allow their 
expression in the same currency.40
It thus arises that the needs of contemporary trade would be met by 
allowing the set-off of claims expressed in different currencies, as long 
as they are mutually convertible and there are no additional costs in-
volved.41 The conversion rate for the calculation of the different monetary 
claims in set-off should be determined on the day of the notice of set-off 
because it is at this point that the legal effects of set-off come into force.42 
The notice of set-off does not have any effects on the choice of currency 
for the conversion of the claims in set-off. Although this notice is a con-
stitutive, unilateral legal act which is a precondition for set-off, the actual 
effects of set-off commence when the requirements for set-off are met.43 
34  See also R Goode, Legal Problems of Credit and Security (3rd edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2003) 
153; Zimmermann (n 1) 48. 
35  In that regard, see also for example § 387 BGB; Schuetler (33) 2651; Zimmermann (n 1) 
48; § 120 OR; Art 1196 para 2 Italian CC; Art 1291 French CC. 
36  ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 149-153.
37  See also ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 32-34.
38  Gernhuber (n 33) 220; Zimmermann (n 1)  49. Also imunovi  (n 4) 151. 
39  Also confi rmed by Gernhuber (n 33) 220; Zimmermann (n 1) 49-50.
40  See also ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 151; PR Wood, English and International Set-Off (Sweet & Max-
well 1989) 509; Zimmermann (n 1) 49.
41  ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 151.
42  See also ibid; Zimmermann (n 1)  10, 49; Schuetler (n 33) 2651 2652.
43  ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 150-151.
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Therefore, the currency should also be determined in accordance with 
the moment the claims are considered discharged.44 
3.2.3 Maturity 
Maturity is the third requirement of set-off under the EU rules.45 
Just like the other requirements, it was not expressly defi ned, but was 
mentioned in the provision of 13:101 PECL III. The regulation of maturity 
as a requirement for set-off was done in accordance with German law.46 
This solution is based on the understanding that the person who is de-
claring set-off is entitled to set off its mature obligation against the pre-
mature obligation of the other side, as soon as it has the right to offer the 
performance of its obligation.47  Maturity in set-off should be treated the 
same as in performance, and the set-off of obligations should be allowed 
before the maturity deadline.48 
It is clear that the creators of the EU model law of set-off have reg-
ulated the maturity requirement in an appropriate manner. If an obliga-
tion can be performed before it is mature, then it should also be allowed 
to be set off under the same terms. The creditor of a premature claim who 
is expecting to set off his monetary claim once it is mature does not need 
protection if he is also a debtor who has defaulted on his obligation.49
The EU model law of set-off does not contain provisions to allow for 
the compensation of damages incurred by the person receiving a set-off 
notice. 50  If damages are caused by set-off, the provisions for the compen-
sation of damages for premature performance should be applied.51
The maturity requirement does not mean that a premature obliga-
tion can be set off against a mature obligation of the person declaring 
set-off. Such a solution would be contrary to the rules of performance 
under which the creditor cannot request performance of an obligation 
before it is mature.52 
44  ibid.
45  See Article 13:101 PECL III.
46  For German law, see KH Gursky, J. von Staudingers Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen Ge-
setzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, buch 2: Recht der Schuldverhältnisse 
§§362-396 (Erfüllung, Hinterlegung, Aufrechnung) (Sellier-de Gruyer 2016) 349; Zimmer-
mann (n 1)  50.
47  W Johnston, Set-Off Law and Practice (OUP 2006) 175.
48  ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 150. For German law, see Gursky (n 46) 329.
49  See also ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 150 regarding the maturity requirement.
50  For German Law, see MüKoBGB/Schlüter, 2016, BGB § 391 R no 2.
51  ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 150.
52  imunovi  (n 4) 154.
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 Therefore, a person cannot be put in a more favourable position 
through set-off than they would have been in if their obligation was ter-
minated through performance.53 
3.2.4 Actionability 
The EU model law of set-off allows for the set-off of claims whose 
performance cannot be forced. This arises out of Article 14:503 PECL 
III which provides that a claim can be set off after its expiration only if 
the debtor does not raise an objection immediately or within two months 
from the notice of set-off. 54 
This regulation is specifi c with regard to the provisions of the na-
tional laws of the Member States. For example, set-off is not allowed 
against claims which are objectionable.55 Unlike the German and EU 
regulation of the actionability requirement, Swiss law, through Article 
§ 120 paragraph 3 OR provides that a claim can be set off even after 
it has expired if it was valid at the moment when set-off became pos-
sible.56 Swiss authors state that only the claim of the person declaring 
set-off has to be actionable at the moment the legal requirements for 
set-off were fulfi lled, while the compensated claim does not have to be 
actionable.57 
The analysis of the compared laws and the EU model law of set-off 
leads to the conclusion that the various laws do not address the moment 
until which an expired claim can be set off. The solution provided in the 
EU model law of set-off is appropriate because it follows the logic that an 
expired claim still exists, but is no longer actionable. If the deadline for 
the objection was not provided, there would be great confusion due to 
the ability of the debtor to raise an objection for expiration of the claim 
at any time. 
53  For German law, see also Gursky (n 46) 329.
54  See Article 14:503 PECL III. See also the DCFR and imunovi  (n 4) 33.
55  This approach has been in force in Germany since 1 January 2002. Available at <https://
vpn.pravo.hr/,DanaInfo=beck-online.beck.de,SSL+Dokument?vpath=bibdata%5Cges%5C-
bgb%5Ccont%5Cbgb.p390.htm&versionDate=20000101#lawversion> accessed 4 Decem-
ber 2018. For German law, see K Larenz, Lehrbuch des Schuldrechts, erster band, Allgemei-
ner Teil (13th edn, CH Beck 1982) 258.
56  See Johnston (n 47) 435. 
57  P Gauch, WR Schluep, J Schmidt, H Rey, & S  Emmenegger, Schweizeriches Obliga-
tionenrecht Allgemeiner Teil: ohne ausservertragliches Haftpfl ichtrecht, band 2 (10th edn, 
Schulthess 2014) 225-226.
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3.2.5 Liquidity 
Article 13:102 PECL III provides that a debtor may not set off a claim 
whose existence or value is uncertain unless the set-off will not prejudice 
the interests of the other party.58 Where the claims of both parties arise 
from the same legal relationship, it is presumed that the other party’s 
interests will not be prejudiced.59 This provision was introduced based 
on the infl uence of Romanic legal systems which also provide for the li-
quidity requirement. This requirement ensures that the claims in set-off 
cannot be contested in terms of their legal basis and amount.60 
The analysis of the arguments in favour of and against the liquidity 
requirement shows that the existing provisions are not a good solution. 
Namely, the creators of PECL III have included the liquidity requirement, 
which is the approach taken by Romanic legal systems, where automatic 
set-off is the norm. In such cases, the obligations are terminated once 
the statutory requirements are met. However, PECL III accepts unilateral 
set-off, whose effects take place upon a unilateral notice of set-off, which 
is a unilateral legal act and which terminates the obligations regardless 
of the objections of the other party. Therefore, one of its main charac-
teristics is the disregard of the reaction of the other party. On the other 
hand, the setting liquidity as a requirement for set-off (to a certain ex-
tent) seeks the reaction of the other party, who can contest the existence 
and amount of the claims and obligations in set-off, which raises the 
question of the intent behind this provision. 
Under the EU model law of set-off, set off is a transformational right, 
the occurrence of which depends on the fulfi lment of the requirements 
for set-off and the notice of set-off. Any objection raised from the other 
party would be contrary to the legal nature of set-off, which is a trans-
formational right. According to the existing provisions, the introduction 
of liquidity as a requirement creates room for the objections of the other 
party. It also hinders the realisation of set-off. In other words, if the other 
party is dissatisfi ed with the fact that the claim was terminated through 
set-off, it can contest the claim itself and obstruct the set-off in gener-
al. Therefore, this requirement should be removed, and any doubts the 
parties might have about the legal basis and amount of claim should not 
have any impact on the legal effects of set-off. The legal effects of set-off 
will take place when the statutory requirements for set-off are fulfi lled 
and the notice of set-off is made, and they should not depend on any 
58  See article 13:102 (1) PECL III. See also HN Schelhaas, The Principles of European Con-
tract Law (Part III) and Dutch Law: A Commentary II (Kluwer Law International 2006) 150. 
59  Compare Article 13:102 paragraphs 1-2 PECL III with Article 6:103 DCFR. See also 
©imunoviÊ (n 4) 32-34.
60  For Spanish law, see Article 1196 paragraph 4 of the Spanish CC.
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challenge made to a claim. The fact there is a dispute about some claim 
does not make it inadequate for set-off.61 
Along with the aforementioned critiques, an additional issue caused 
by the liquidity requirement is the time limit for raising the liquidity 
objection. Considering the fact that the deadline was not expressly pre-
scribed, the existing solution leads to legal uncertainty. Therefore, the 
time limit for the liquidity objection should be defi ned, just as in the case 
of actionability. 
3.3 Unilateral set-off  
Article 13:104 regulates the unilateral declaration of set-off by stat-
ing that the right of set-off is exercised by notice made to the other party. 
This shows that the creators of the EU model law of set-off chooses the 
Germanic set-off model, which is mainly represented by German law in 
which the obligations are terminated only after the notice of set-off which 
follows the fulfi lment of the requirements for set-off.62 
The EU model law of set-off has rejected the idea of automatic set-off 
which includes the notice of set-off as a prerequisite. Furthermore, it re-
jected the set-off model which is characteristic of English law and which 
requires a court decision which would allow the legal effects of set-off to 
take place.
A comparison of the automatic and unilateral set-off models shows 
that unilateral set-off is a better solution because of the improved infor-
mation fl ow of the parties and it avoids unnecessary complications. This 
is also confi rmed by the abandonment of automatic set-off in France 
and Italian practice where the notice of set-off is practised by default, 
although it is not a written rule, in order to avoid unwanted situations.63 
3.4 The legal effects of set-off
Article 13:106 PECL III provides that set-off discharges the obliga-
tions, as far as they are coextensive, as from the time of the unilateral 
notice. This effect of set-off under EU rules is called the ex nunc effect 
(hereinafter: ex nunc effect or approach).64 Despite the fact that the EU 
61  See also ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 165-166.
62  Unilateral set-off is present today in Austrian, Swiss, French and Croatian law. imunovi  
(n 4) 64.
63  ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 64-67. 
64  ibid, 151. The Roman term ex nunc means: ‘from now on − a term used in contract law to 
specify terms that are voided or confi rmed in effect only in future and not only in the future 
and not prior to the contract, or its adjudication’. NH Nguyen, Essential 25000 English-Ro-
manian Law Dictionary (e-book, no 8746, 2018).
147CYELP 15 [2019] 135-153
model law of set-off refl ects the Germanic set-off model, it is specifi c for 
the fact that the legal effects under the EU model law of set-off does not 
have the retroactive effect that it has in the Germanic model of set-off.65 
Therefore, the legal effects under the EU model law of set-off take 
place upon the unilateral notice of set-off but not retroactively from the 
moment when being suitable for set-off the obligations fi rst confronted 
each other.66 The creators of the EU model law of set-off considered that 
it should induce the parties which have compensable claims to declare 
set-off as soon as possible.67 
The possibility of retroactive set-off effects would allow the parties 
to delay and stall the discharge of compensable claims.68 They repre-
sent the viewpoint that the ex nunc approach to the effects of set-off is 
more equitable in terms of the calculation of interest and other ancillary 
rights.69 In their view, the retroactive effect of set-off deviates from the 
effects caused by the partial performance of claims,70 while the ex nunc 
effects are in line with these effects.71 
The opponents of the ex nunc model state that the only purpose 
of set-off is the mutual discharge of opposing compensable claims, and 
not the inducement of any party to declare set-off. The persons subject 
to these rights should be allowed to make the most favourable choice, 
whether that is set-off or performance.72 It can be stated that the intent 
behind the adoption of the existing ex nunc effect model was to reconcile 
the differences among the opposing set-off effects. Despite this legitimate 
goal, this approach can be criticised from various angles.73 
65  See Gursky (n 46) 421; P Pichonnaz, ‘The Retroactive Effect of Set-Off (Compensatio): 
A Journey Through Roman Law to the New Dutch Civil Code’ (2000) 68(4) Tijdschrift voor 
rechtsgeschiedenis 544. See also ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 212-214. 
66  Zimmermann (n 1)  36.
67  R Zimmermann, Die Aufrechnung − Eine rechtsvergleichende Skizze zum Europäischen 
Vertragsrecht (Dieter Medicus 1999) 721-723.
68  Zimmermann (n 1) 39.
69  P Bydlinski, Die Aufrechung mit verjährten Forderungen: Wirklich kein Anderungsbedarf? 
(Archiv für die Civilistische Praxis, vol 196, 1996) 287; Zimmermann (n 1) 41.
70  Zimmermann (n 1) 39; P Gauch & V Aepli, Obligationenrecht Das Erlöschen der Obliga-
tionen, 1 Lieferung, § 114-126 OR (3rd edn, Schulthess 1991) 65.
71  See more in P Bydlinski, ‚Die Aufrechung mit verjährten Forderungen: Wirklich kein 
Anderungsbedarf? (1996) Band 196, Heft 3, Archiv für die Civilistische Praxis 276; Zimmer-
mann (n 1) 723; Zimmermann (n 1) 36-43. For the opposite opinion, see Gursky (n 46) 441. 
See also for Croatian law ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 212-214. B Mugdan, Die gesammten Materialien 
zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch für das Deutsche Reich (band 1, R v Decker 1899) 512.
72  See also for Croatian law ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 212-214. Gursky opposes the ex nunc effects 
of set-off (n 46) 441.
73  See Gursky (n 46) 441. Zimmermann (n 1) 39.
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Firstly, the existing ex nunc effect of unilateral set-off under the EU 
model law of set-off is a very rare occurrence.74 Secondly, the criticisms of 
the opponents of the retroactive effect are truly not convincing. Namely, 
the purpose of the set-off rules is not the preferable treatment of set-off in 
comparison to performance as a means of discharging obligations. Both 
set-off and performance are equally valid ways to discharge obligations, 
and neither is superior or inferior to the other.75 Therefore, the opponents 
of the ex nunc effects of set-off are right to conclude that the intent of the 
legislator cannot be the inducement of set-off notices by parties, because 
such a decision is left to the disposal of the parties.76   
The third and most important criticism is the fact that the retroac-
tive effects of set-off match the effects of real performance. In particular, 
the different treatment of retroactive effects and performance which is 
invoked by the proponents of the ex nunc approach are not caused by the 
retroactive effect, but rather by the inaccurate calculation of the main 
and ancillary claims. If the calculation of the main and ancillary claims 
is done carefully, then the effects of the retroactive approach to set-off 
and performance are completely harmonised.77  
Contrary to this, in the ex nunc approach there is a different treat-
ment in comparison to the effects of performance, because it discards 
ancillary claims of the side whose claim became due before the counter-
claim. Therefore, the recommendation is that the EU set-off moves from 
ex nunc to retroactive effects in order to harmonise the effects of set-off 
with the effects of performance.
3.5 Calculations in set-off
Article 13:105 PECL III provides that where the party giving notice 
of set-off has two or more claims against the other party, the notice is ef-
fective only if it identifi es the claim to which it relates.78 Where the party 
giving notice of set-off has to perform two or more obligations towards 
the other party, the rules in Article 7:109 apply with appropriate adap-
tations.79 
74  N Jansen & R Zimmermann 2002, Commentaries on European Contract Laws (OUP 
2018) 1810.
75  Set-off and performance are not in a mutual position of superiority or inferiority. ©imu-
noviÊ (n 4) 214.
76  Gursky (n 46) 441. For Croatian law, see ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 214.
77  In this sense, see ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 214; Gursky (n 46) 441.
78  Article 13:104 (1) PECL III. In this sense, compare the rules on the calculation of per-
formances for multiple claims: Article 13:105 paragraph 2 with Article 9:109 paragraph 3 
PECL III and Article 6:106 DCFR with Article 7:109 paragraph 3.
79  Article 13:104 (2) PECL III.
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This means that the party giving notice of set-off may determine 
which of these claims are to be set off against each other. If there is no 
such specifi cation given, the general rule relating to the appropriation of 
performance will apply mutatis mutandis.80  Although it is not expressly 
provided, the set-off of claims with different locations of performance is 
allowed.81 
This framework follows the same logic which fl ows from the provi-
sions on multiple performances, and it also follows the solutions from 
other comparable legislatures. There was no need to duplicate the provi-
sions on calculations for set-off, since they already exist for the perfor-
mance which is being replaced by set-off.
4 The existing EU model law of set-off in the era of Brexit and the 
changes in the French set-off rules 
The EU model law of set-off was created at a time when there were 
three main set-off models in the EU: German law as the main represen-
tative of unilateral set-off (the so-called Germanic set-off model), French 
law as the main representative of automatic set-off (the Romanic set-off 
model) and English law as the main representative of procedural set-off 
(the English law set-off model).82 
In an era when it is only a matter of time before Britain leaves the 
EU, and after the changes in the French Law on Obligations regarding 
the set-off rules in 2016, when French law abandoned automatic for uni-
lateral set-off (ie abandoned the Romanic for the Germanic model),83 it is 
fi tting to address the sustainability of the EU model law of set-off in its 
current form. This issue is relevant because the EU model law of set-off 
contains elements of both English and French law. 
Firstly, it is evident that English law has had a great infl uence on 
the EU model law of set-off, since the English model has ex nunc and not 
retroactive effects.84 Therefore, after Brexit, Britain will no longer be the 
80  Zimmermann (n 1) 60.
81  ibid.
82  This division was introduced by Zimmermann (n 1) 36.  
83  For more on the reform of the French Law on Obligations, see N Dissaux, Réforme du 
droit des contrats, du régime général et de la preuve des obligations: (ordonnance no 2016-
131 du 10 février 2016): commentaire des articles 1100 à 1386-1 du code civil (Dalloz, DL 
2016) 219.
84  For set-off rules under English law which used to be an inspiration for the EU model 
law of set-off, see the Insolvent Debtors Relief Act of 1729 (confi rmed and amended by the 
Debtors Relief Amendment Act of 1735) the so-called Statutes of Set-Off. See also the Su-
preme Court of Judicature Act of 1873 for procedural rules regarding set-off in English law 
(Zimmermann (n 1) 26-28). Today many types of set-off exist in English law, such as statute 
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biggest proponent of the highly criticised ex nunc approach of the EU 
model law of set-off. Despite this, even if Britain leaves the EU it is in-
disputable that EU Member States, such as Ireland or Malta as common 
law jurisdiction countries, will retain national rules which have ex nunc 
effects of set-off,85 ie rules which are the same or very similar to the En-
glish rules on set-off.86 Therefore, Brexit itself will not lead to the need to 
abandon the ex nunc effects of the EU Model law of set-off, because there 
will be other legislatures which have adopted this model. Even if there 
were no national legislatures within the EU adopting the ex nunc effect 
of set-off, this would not mean that such an effect should be eliminated 
from the EU model law of set-off if this is a good solution. However, if the 
arguments and results of comparative analysis are taken into account, 
the ex nunc effect of the EU model law of set-off is not a good solution. 
According to the author’s best knowledge today, with a suffi cient lapse of 
time, the ex nunc effect of set-off has not only failed to yield the results 
promised by its creators, but the arguments its creators provided for its 
introduction are contrary to the very legal nature of the EU model law of 
set-off.87 
On the other hand, retroactivity is primarily in accordance with 
the legal nature of set-off and it contributes to legal security. Set-off is a 
surrogate for performance. Therefore, the logic behind the legal effects of 
set-off should follow the solutions which exist for performance. Treating 
set-off as a surrogate for performance does not make it inferior or supe-
rior to performance as a modality of the discharge of obligations, but it 
means that they have that they are of an equal status. Therefore, the 
parties to set-off choose whether to discharge their obligations through 
performance or set-off.88 This is why retroactivity is better because the 
parties know when the effects of set-off will take place and it matches the 
effect of performance. Therefore, there is no need to leave the decision on 
set-off, contractual set-off and insolvency set-off (W Johnston & T Werlen, Set-Off Law and 
Practice (OUP 135); PR Wood, English and International Set-off (Sweet and Maxwell 1989) 
23-24; SR Derham, Set-off (OUP 2010) 6; SI Sepinuck, ‘The Problems of Set-Off: A Proposed 
Legislative Solutions’ (1988) 3 William & Mary Law Review 55). According to Derham, there 
is also a similar legal institute of a banker´s right of set-off (Derham) 6. For case law on 
set-off under English law, see Rawson v Samuel (1848) CR and TH 161, 41; Hanak v Green 
(1958) 2 QB 9; Bankes v Jarvis (1903) 1 KB 549; Federal Commerce & Navigation Co Ltd v 
Molena Alpha Inc (1978) 2 QB 927; Bank of Boston Connecticut v European Grain and Sugar 
Ltd (1989) AC 1056; Dole Dried Fruit and Nut Co v Trustin Kerwood Ltd (1990) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 
309; Bin Kemi v Blackburn Chemicals Limited (2001) 2 Lloyd’s Rep 93; and Esso Petroleum 
Co Ltd v Milton (1997) 1 WLR 938, 953. 
85  Wood (40) 9.
86  Ibid. See also N Jansen & R Zimmermann, Commentaries on European Contract Laws 
(OUP 2018) 1810.
87  Zimmermann (n 1) 38.
88  ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 48.
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when the effects of set-off will take place to the party notifying set-off, 
which is the case with the ex nunc effect. 
In light of the above, it can be concluded that Brexit itself does not 
induce the need to abandon the ex nunc effect of set-off, but it enunciates 
the identifi ed fl aws of the ex nunc effect of set-off. Thus, the recommenda-
tion is that the text of the EU model law of set-off regarding the effects of 
set-off (Article 13:106 PECL III) should be amended to read the following: 
‘The effect of set-off is that the claims, to the extent that they correspond, 
are deemed to expire at the time they are set against each other as being 
appropriate for set-off’.89
Aside from Brexit, another signifi cant change happened in the 
French Law on Obligations in relation to set-off. The changes in the 
French law did not have any infl uence on the EU model law of set-off 
because the amendments to the French law occurred in 2016, after the 
adoption of PECL III. However, it is unlikely to infl uence the EU model 
law of set-off in the future either, because the abandonment of automatic 
for unilateral (Germanic) set-off confi rms that the Germanic model is 
preferable. Namely, French authors state that the amendments in the 
French law were made because the Germanic model is more practical 
and provides more information for the parties.90 
The Germanic set-off model which was adopted by the EU model law 
of set-off is more practical because the decision on whether to set off ob-
ligations at all is left to the will of the parties, and not the mere fact that 
the requirements for set-off were met.91 Therefore, under the Germanic 
model, the parties can decide not to set off but to perform their obliga-
tions, which is not possible with automatic set-off. The main disadvan-
tage of automatic set-off is the legal uncertainty which arises when one 
party has several claims while the other has only one. In such situations, 
it is diffi cult to determine which exact claim is discharged because there 
is no notifi cation of set-off which would expressly provide this informa-
tion.92 This is confi rmed by the practice under Italian law which adopts 
the Romanic model of set-off, where the parties provide notice of set-off 
to ensure that the other side is fully aware, which provides some legal 
security.93 
89  As in paragraph 389 BGB.
90  P Pichonnaz, Set-Off Compensatio: From Diversity Unit Comments on the Principles of 
European Contract Law, (Universitat de Lleida Tirant lo Blanch 2005) 287.
91  ibid; ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 66.
92  ibid.
93  MN Kannengiesser, Die Aufrechnung im internationalen Privat- und Verfahrensrecht: Mit 
vergleichender Darstellung ausgewählter europäischer Aufrechnungsrechte (Mohr Siebeck 
1998) 7.
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Parties which are better informed are not only aware of the occur-
rence of set-off, but they are also in a better position to calculate the 
ancillary claims, such as interest and contractual penalties, as well as 
to prove the actual existence of the claims. Finally, in a certain way, it 
could be concluded that the adoption of the EU set-off rules inspired the 
French legislators to amend the French Code civil with regard to set-off. 
In the upcoming period, it will be interesting to observe whether Spain 
and Italy will follow the French lead and abandon the Romanic for the 
Germanic set-off model.94
5 Instead of a conclusion: the future of the EU model law of set-off 
The EU model law of set-off has had a great impact on European 
private law, because its adoption opened a number of important legal 
questions and initiated the fi rst systematic comparative analysis of na-
tional set-off provisions at the EU level. EU set-off is unilateral and not 
automatic, but the effects of set-off take place after the notice of set-off is 
given to the other side (the so-called ex nunc effects), and not as soon as 
the legal requirements are met.95 
This approach was introduced under the strong infl uence of Great 
Britain and it differs greatly from the Germanic approach and it is right-
ly criticised. It deviates from the regular regime which applies for the 
performance of obligations and it unduly disregards the ancillary rights 
(interest and costs) of only one party. The party whose claim is mature 
will thereby have the advantage, because the set-off effects take place 
later than they would under the retroactive approach. Thereby, the party 
whose claim matures at a later stage will not have to pay the interest it 
usually would if set-off had not occurred. 
Therefore, retroactivity is a better solution than the ex nunc effect 
because it comports with the legal nature of set-off and it contributes 
to the legal certainty of the parties in set-off. The retroactive effects of 
set-off match the effects of performance and the parties in set-off know 
when these legal effects will take place. Thus, there is no need to al-
low the notifying party to determine when the effects of set-off will take 
place, which is allowed with the ex nunc effect. 
The disadvantages of retroactivity which were cited by the creators 
of the EU model law of set-off are not accurate because if the calculation 
rules are applied carefully through the retroactive set-off approach, then 
its effects will match those of partial performance.  Therefore, consider-
94  ibid.
95  ©imunoviÊ (n 4) 33. 
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ing the results of the conducted analysis, there should be a shift from 
the existing ex nunc approach (from the moment of the unilateral notifi -
cation of set-off) to the retroactive effects of set-off (from the moment the 
requirements of set-off were fulfi lled for the fi rst time). 
With regard to Brexit, there is no doubt that the most prominent 
proponent of the ex nunc effects of set-off will leave the EU, but other 
countries adopting the same approach will remain (such as Ireland and 
Malta). However, although Brexit itself does not lead to the elimination of 
the ex nunc effect of set-off, it brings its defi ciencies to the surface. 
In the context of the changes in French law regarding set-off, it is 
concluded that they do not have any effect on the EU model law of set-off. 
On the contrary, the changes which have occurred in French law with 
regard to set-off prove that the unilateral set-off model which is adopted 
in the EU model law of set-off is a good solution because parties who are 
better informed are not only aware of the occurrence of set-off, but they 
are also in a better position to calculate the ancillary claims such as in-
terest and contractual penalties, and to prove the actual existence of the 
claim. However, it will be interesting to see how this will impact on other 
legal systems, such as Italy and Spain, which still adopt the automatic 
set-off model.  
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